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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. s 
ERLENE KAY STRIEBY, : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the majority decision of the Court of Appeals 
erroneously determined that there was no evidence to support the 
trial court's findings of fact upon which defendant's conviction 
was based; that is, whether that decision so far departed from a 
proper application of the standard of review for bench trials 
that this Court should exercise its supervisory authority and 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. See Utah R. App. 
P. 46(c). 
OPINION BELOW 
State v. Strieby, No. 890124-CA (Utah Ct. App. March 
30, 1990) (see Addendum A for the text of the decision). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This is a petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals which reversed defendant's conviction for 
manslaughter, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989), in a decision entered March 30, 
1990. No petition for rehearing was filed. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
SS 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) and 78-2a-4 (1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS 
Defendant, Erlene Kay Strieby, was charged with second 
degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 2-3). 
Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense 
of manslaughter, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989), on November 30, 1988, 
following a bench trial, in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Tooele County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
Judge, presiding (R. at 86). Defendant was sentenced by Judge 
Rigtrup on January 9, 1989, to a term of one to fifteen years at 
the Utah State Prison, and ordered to pay restitution in an 
amount to be determined by the Board of Pardons at the time of 
release (R. at 86). On January 18, 1989, defendant filed a 
motion for new trial (R. at 87-88). On February 8, 1989, the 
motion was denied (R. at 114-116). 
On appeal, the conviction was reversed in State v. 
Strieby, No. 890124-CA (Utah Ct. App. March 30, 1990). In that 
decision, two members of the panel concluded: 
The [trial] court agreed with the prosecution 
that Chris [the victim] went into the kitchen 
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and poured something to drink before 
following defendant upstairs. This 
conclusion is not supported by any evidence 
in the trial record; it is merely the 
prosecution's supposition. A court may not 
"'make speculative leap[s] across . . . 
remaining gap[sj' in the evidence." 
Striebyf slip op. at 6 (citing State v. Harmanf 767 P.2d 567, 568 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), quoting State fr. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 445 
(Utah 1983)). 
At trial, the evidence, much of it from the defendant 
herself, revolved around an ongoing fight between defendant and 
her husband, Chris Strieby. On July 7, 1988, defendant and Mr. 
Strieby "got into a heated argument over sex" (R. 137 at 230). 
The next day, defendant returned from her job in Grantsville and, 
after some time at the Striebys' home, went to the welding shop 
where Mr. Strieby worked (R. 137 at 232-33). There defendant 
confronted Mr. Strieby, then left and went to a local club and 
drank "about four mini bottles" of alcoholic beverages (R. 136 at 
47-48 and R. 137 at 233-34). Defendant returned to the trailer 
at which Mr. Strieby's father lived, next to the welding shop, 
and again confronted her husband (R. 136 at 50-55, 68, and 74-
79). Mr. Strieby had also been drinking at this point (R. 136 at 
72). Witnesses testified that defendant "lunged" at the victim 
and tried to hit him and they wrestled and fell to the floor (R. 
136 at 52-54 and 74-79). Mr. Strieby held defendant down on the 
floor until she "calmed down enough," then let her get to her 
feet (R. 136 at 54). Defendant told Mr. Strieby that "as soon as 
she got her hands on a gun, he was a dead SOB" (R. 136 at 79). 
--*-
Defendant returned to the Strieby home and sent Mr. 
Strieby's nephew to give Mr. Strieby a ride home (R. 136 at 106-
108). The nephew dropped Mr. Strieby at the home and left at 
about 6:30 p.m. (R. 136 at 109-111). At 6:38 p.m. the Tooele 
County Sheriff's Office received a report of a shooting at the 
Strieby residence (R. 136 at 18). Only defendant's statements 
recite what occurred between the time that Mr. Strieby's nephew 
left and the time that defendant walked out of the home and to a 
neighbor's house and asked them to call the sheriff. 
Defendant gave the deputy sheriff a statement the night 
of the shooting, stating that Mr. Strieby had threatened her, 
told her to get the gun, and told her that the gun was not loaded 
(State's Exhibit [hereinafter St. Exh.] #14 at 2-3). She told 
the deputy that she was upset, went and got the gun, and shot Mr. 
Strieby. She also stated that the gun was loaded even though she 
had thought that it was not (St. Exh. #14 at 4 and 8). 
According to defendant's trial testimony, the following 
occurred. Mr. Strieby arrived home, and he and defendant began 
pushing and shoving each other (R. 137 at 240). Defendant tried 
to go out the door and Mr. Strieby slammed it shut (R. 137 at 
241). Defendant then pushed Mr. Strieby and ran up the stairs, 
but he pulled her back down (R. 137 at 241). She "[p]ushed him 
up against the wall" (R. 137 at 242), causing Mr. Strieby to lose 
his balance: 
I pushed him away, and he'd lose his balance. 
He slid down the wall once. And when he got 
up, he grabbed at me. And I kicked him in 
the groin. I pushed him, and he went into 
the kitchen. 
-A-
(R. 137 at 243) (emphasis added). When Mr. Strieby attempted to 
strike her, she "moved, and he went clear to the stairs with his 
fist" (R. 137 at 242). She got away from him a "couple of 
times", being "faster than he was at the time to get away" (R. 
137 at 263). Defendant then pushed Mr. Strieby once again, and 
"he went into the kitchen . . . all this time telling me he was 
going to kill me" (R. 137 at 243) (emphasis added). She "got 
away because he lost his balance a couple of times" (R. 137 at 
262-263, 266, 268).X 
Mr. Strieby broke off the confrontation and went into 
the kitchen, and defendant ran upstairs (R. 137 at 242, 243, 245 
and 267-68; see Addendum B for a copy of these record pages). 
Mr. Strieby continued to yell threats and insults (R. 137 at 
245). Defendant could not recall where she obtained the weapon, 
stating only "I know that I had the gun in my hands and was at 
the top of the stairs when he was rounding the stairs to come up 
the second flight" (R. 137 at 246). Defendant admitted that she 
knew the gun was loaded (R. 137 at 271, 273). As Mr. Strieby 
rounded the corner of the stairs, defendant fired a single shot, 
striking him in the face and killing him instantly (R. 137 at 
247). Defendant then placed the gun on the bedroom nightstand 
and went to the neighbors for help (R. 137 at 279). 
After hearing this evidence, the trial court found 
defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter 
At trial, the state medical examiner testified that Mr. 
Strieby's blood alcohol content at the time of his death was 
.25%; this obviously impaired Mr. Striebyfs ability to move (R. 
136 at 117). 
(R. 137 at 318-26). The court indicated that it had "no 
substantial reason to doubt Mrs. Strieby's version" of the fight 
(R, 137 at 321). The court commented on the impairment that Mr. 
Strieby displayed in the testimony of defendant. The court said: 
It appears to the Court that Chris Strieby 
grabbed Mrs. Strieby, pushed her a number of 
occasions [sic]. And it appears to the Court 
that she was able to pull away at least a 
couple of times. It appears to the Court 
that during the scuffle, she was able to push 
him away either with her arms or with her leg 
or foot on one occasion. 
During the fisticuffs, even by the 
defendant's version, Chris Strieby swung and 
missed on one occasion, which would suggest 
some impairment of his physical abilities and 
his coordination. 
(R. 137 at 323-24). The court then commented on the evidence of 
a cap, a blue cup and spilled liquid which were found next to the 
victim's body (R. 136 at 26 41, and 144). The court said: 
And the only rational way that that glass 
got to the landing [where the body lay], in 
the Court's view, is consistent with what Mr. 
[Nash] said. As Chris was pushed on the one 
occasion and fell and tumbled, she went up 
the stairs and he went into the kitchen and 
poured himself a drink. If that occurred, 
then there was a reasonable, substantial 
cessation in what had started at the door. 
There was no physical evidence that Mrs. 
Strieby had, other than initially, tried any 
vigorous efforts to escape the condo, to 
shout, to holler, to seek the assistance of 
others. There was no evidence in the record 
to suggest that she had used objects of 
furniture or anything else in the house to 
fend him off or to take any evasive action. 
But rather that she went up the stairs and 
got the gun at a time when he wasn't in 
vigorous, hot pursuit. 
(R. 137 at 324-25) (emphasis added). Based on these findings, 
the trial court determined that defendant did not act in self-
defense but did cause 
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the death of Chris Strieby under 
circumstances of emotional, extreme emotional 
disturbance and [the court] finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was not a 
reasonable explanation or excuse for such 
conduct and concludes accordingly that she 
stands guilty of the crime of Manslaughter, a 
Second Degree Felony. 
(R. 137 at 325-26). 
ARGUMENT 
THE MAJORITY DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
FOR FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE TRIAL COURT WHEN 
IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THAT COURT IN 
THIS MATTER. 
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in this 
case stated the correct standard of review but incorrectly 
applied it when the majority reversed the decision of the trial 
court. Because this trial was to the bench, the Court of Appeals 
correctly stated that the standard of review was that given in 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). That standard is 
the "clearly erroneous" standard taken from Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
requires that if the findings (or the trial 
court's verdict in a criminal case) are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made, the findings (or verdict) will 
be set aside. 
Strieby, slip op. at 3. While this standard was correctly given 
in the case, it was incorrectly applied. 
The majority stated that the trial court's conclusion 
that the victim had gone into the kitchen and poured something to 
drink before going up the stairs was clearly erroneous. The 
majority stated M[t]hat this conclusion is not supported by any 
evidence in the trial record; it is merely the prosecution's 
supposition". Strieby/ slip op. at 6 (emphasis added). The 
majority then concluded that the trial court had filled a gap in 
the evidence with speculation and that the State had not proven 
that defendant did not act in self-defense. Ibid. 
As was pointed out by Judge Bench in his concurring and 
dissenting opinion, there was no gap in the evidence. Contrary 
to the majority's statement, there is evidence in the trial 
record supporting the trial court's finding that the victim had 
broken off the confrontation before defendant went up the stairs 
and retrieved the gun. Four times in defendant's own testimony 
she stated that Mr. Strieby left her and went into the kitchen 
(R. 137 at 242, 243, 245 and 267-68; Addendum B). The majority 
opinion totally ignored defendant's statements when it stated 
that there was no evidence in the record to support the trial 
court's finding that the victim had discontinued the fight. 
Judge Bench's concurring and dissenting opinion 
correctly analyzed the evidence presented at trial and correctly 
applied the standard of review. As Judge Bench said: 
The trial court concluded that defendant 
did not act in self-defense because there was 
a "reasonable, substantial cessation" in the 
hostilities when Mr. Strieby went into the 
kitchen to pour himself a drink. In 
reversing this case, my colleagues state that 
this finding "is not supported by any 
evidence in the trial record; it is merely 
the prosecution's supposition." Yet 
defendant herself testified that, during the 
fight on the stairs, "I kicked him in the 
groin. I pushed him, and he went into the 
kitchen." Whether he fixed a drink or not, I 
believe the evidence supports the trial 
court's finding regarding cessation of 
hostilities. At that point, given her 
relative level of intoxication (another 
factual finding), defendant could have done 
any number of things to protect herself. 
Instead, she went upstairs, picked up a 
loaded revolver, and waited for Mr. Strieby. 
Under these circumstances, there was a 
basis for the trial court to find that 
defendant could not have reasonably believed 
that shooting Mr. Strieby was necessary to 
prevent her own imminent death or serious 
bodily injury. I do not believe the court's 
finding is clearly erroneous. 
Strieby, slip op. at 7-8 (emphasis in original; footnote 
omitted). 
In the recent case of Sweeney Land Company v. Kimball, 
127 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah February 9, 1990), this Court 
reversed a panel of the Court of Appeals because that court had 
misapplied the Rule 52(a) standard of review. In that case, the 
panel of the Court of Appeals had substituted its judgment about 
the credibility of a witness for that of the trial court. In the 
present case, the error of the majority is even more egregious 
because the majority has not only substituted its judgment for 
that of the trial court, but it also has erroneously denied that 
there was any record evidence to support the trial court's 
finding. Defendant's own testimony clearly supports the finding 
of the trial court that hostilities ceased before the shooting. 
Therefore, the majority erred in determining that the finding was 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Accordingly, this court should grant certiorari to 
review the decision of the Court of Appeals, which reflects a 
substantial departure from the standard of review enunciated in 
State v. Walker. See R. Utah App. P. 46(c). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court grant its petition for writ of certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this :2(/^ day of April, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Neil A. Kaplan and Anneli R. Smith, Attorneys for Defendant, 
200 American Savings Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101, this pi- " day of April, 1990. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
F ILED 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Erlene Kay Strieby, 
Defendant and Appellant• 
*~ /C *i< of t* 
OPINION »»wC#*rt* 
(For Publication) 
Court 
Case No. 890124-CA 
Third District, Tooele County 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
Attorneys: Neil A. Kaplan and Anneli R. Smith, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Erlene Kay Strieby was convicted of 
manslaughter, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989). She appeals her conviction, 
claiming that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient 
to justify a conviction of manslaughter. We reverse. 
On July 8, 1988, defendant shot her husband, Chris 
Strieby, while both were in their condominium in Tooele, Utah. 
On the morning of that same day, defendant and Chris argued 
briefly while at Chris's father's welding shop. Defendant then 
drove to The Eagle's, a local club, where she consumed several 
alcoholic drinks. 
Later in the afternoon, defendant went to Chris's 
father's trailer, which was parked alongside the welding shop, 
to take Chris home. He had consumed between one-third and 
one-half of a fifth of vodka. They began arguing again. 
Defendant tried to slap Chris's face. He grabbed her shirt, 
pinned her to the floor, and held her there by the neck for a 
few minutes while she struggled. After he released her, 
defendant called her friend, Charlotte Gourley, who came to the 
trailer and took defendant to the Striebys' condominium. 
Defendant then sent Joseph Gruenwald and Kenneth Taylor, young 
men temporarily living with the Striebys, to pick Chris up. 
The young men dropped him off outside the condominium and 
immediately left for Salt Lake City. 
Defendants version of what occurred at the condominium 
is as follows. When Chris entered the condominium, he 
physically attacked defendant and threatened to kill her. He 
told defendant, "I am going to kill you, you bitch. You don't 
deserve to live." She attempted to leave by the front door, 
but he slammed the door shut. They then scuffled in the 
entryway and defendant ran upstairs. Chris pursued her and 
caught her on the landing, where he grabbed her leg, pulled her 
to the floor, and dragged her down the stairs on her back. He 
attempted to strike her with his fist while she was still lying 
on the stairs. She evaded the strike and kicked him away with 
her foot. He then went into the kitchen. At this point, 
defendant ran upstairs to their bedroom, took a .357 magnum 
from its holster in the closet, and returned to the top of the 
stairs. Chris was ascending the stairs, shouting threats and 
obscenities. When he reached the landing and was starting up 
the second flight, defendant told him to leave. She pled with 
him to give her a couple days to pack her belongings and leave, 
but he continued to verbally threaten to kill her. Defendant 
then fired a single round, which entered Chris's mouth and 
lodged in the second cervical vertebrae, instantly killing him. 
Defendant was charged with second degree murder. At 
trial, she argued that she acted in self-defense. Although the 
judge stated that he had no substantial reason to doubt 
defendant's testimony that she feared for her life, he 
convicted her of manslaughter after a bench trial. 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred 
in: (1) finding the evidence sufficient to make a prima facie 
case of manslaughter at the close of the State's case in chief; 
(2) finding evidence sufficient to convict her of manslaughter; 
and (3) ordering restitution. Since we conclude that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
we do not reach defendant's claim of an improper restitution 
order. 
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence 
from a bench trial conviction, we note that 
the content of Rule 52(a)fs ••clearly 
erroneousH standard, imported from the 
federal rule, requires that if the 
findings (or the trial court's verdict in 
a criminal case) are against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made, the findings (or 
verdict) will be set aside. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); £££ also State 
v. Mitchell, 769 P.2d 817, 818 (Utah 1989). This standard of 
review is less deferential than that applied in a jury trial 
because of the multi-member versus single fact finder, and 
requires that the evidence presented not be contrary to the 
verdict. State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-787 (Utah 1988). 
1. Prima Facie Case 
A person commits manslaughter when she or he: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under 
the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(c) causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct 
although the conduct i^s not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989). 
Defendant asserts that because the State failed to prove 
the elements of manslaughter during its case in chief, the 
court should have granted defendants motion for judgment of 
acquittal. She argues that the State was required to, but did 
not prove the absence of self-defense, and thus failed to prove 
the elements of manslaughter. We disagree. 
The interplay between Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1982) and 
rule 17(o) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-17(o) (1982)) requires a trial judge to grant a 
motion for judgment of acquittal when the prosecution fails to 
present enough believable evidence to put the defendant to her 
defense. State v. Smith. 675 P.2d,521, 524 (Utah 1983). The 
State is required to show some evidence of every element of its 
cause of action, or a lesser included offense, to avoid an 
unfavorable directed verdict at the close of its case in 
chief. However, the State is not required to prove a dearth of 
self defense as one of those elements. The Utah Supreme Court 
has specifically held that an "[a]bsence of self-defense is not 
one of the prima facie elements of homicide." State v. Knoll, 
712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985).x 
We find at the close of the State's case in chief, there 
was enough evidence to set forth all of the statutory elements 
of manslaughter. Defendant admitted to causing the death of 
Chris Strieby, and at this point in the proceeding, the 
evidence presented did not legally justify her actions. We 
find the State's evidence sufficient to establish the prima 
facie elements of manslaughter and require defendant to proceed* 
2. Verdict 
Defendant next argues that she is not guilty of 
manslaughter because she was justified in shooting Chris under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1978) which states: 
[A] person is justified in using force 
which is intended or likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury only if he 
reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury to himself or a third 
person, or to prevent the commission of a 
forcible felony. 
Defendant maintains that Chris's violent physical attack, 
coupled with his threats to kill her, led her to believe that 
force was necessary to protect herself from death or serious 
1. The court stated, "Self defense is a justification for a 
killing and a defense to prosecution." Forcing the prosecution 
to prove the absence of self defense would force it to prove a 
negative, a burden which the law typically does not impose. 
Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214. 
bodily injury. She testified that Chris's rage and violence 
escalated beyond anything she had previously experienced with 
him. The trial judge apparently believed defendant's story. 
He specifically found that upon arriving at the condominium, 
Chris physically attacked defendant, and that given Chris's 
••powerful, muscular build,H there was "no substantial doubt 
about the reality11 of her fear for her life. 
Defendant's account was corroborated by the testimony of 
Dr. Mark Vernon Anderson, who treated defendant in the Tooele 
Valley Hospital emergency room after the incident on July 9, 
1988. Dr. Anderson diagnosed a ruptured disc in defendant's 
neck, a fresh rug burn on her left elbow, and a hand shaped 
bruise on her left upper arm. She also had a swollen left eye, 
a cut on her forehead, and a red mark on the front of her 
neck. At trial, Dr. Anderson testified that the ruptured disc 
and the rug burn were probably caused by defendant being 
dragged down the stairs. He also noted that defendant's 
medical history included four previous back surgeries and neck 
problems. He opined that being dragged down the stairs put her 
at a much higher risk of serious injury than a person with a 
••normal" healthy back. Defendant testified that Chris was 
aware of her back problems. 
Despite this evidence and his own findings, the trial 
judge concluded that defendant did not act in self-defense 
because (1) defendant was "quicker and more agile given their 
relative levels of intoxication," and (2) the presence of a 
blue plastic cup on the landing indicated there had been a 
•'reasonable, substantial cessation" in hostilities. 
There is little, if any, evidence in the record to 
support the trial judge's conclusion that Chris's coordination 
was impaired by alcohol to the extent that he was not a serious 
threat to defendant. The autopsy report showed Chris had a .25 
blood alcohol content. Dr. Edwin Steven Sweeney, State Medical 
Examiner, examined the body on July 9, 1988. He testified that 
a .25 blood alcohol content would strongly affect self control 
and judgment, and might affect coordination, but to a lesser 
extent. Further, defendant testified Chris prevented her from 
fleeing out the front door and caught her as she first ran 
upstairs to the landing. Finally, defendant's actual injuries 
illustrate that Chris was fully capable of seriously harming 
defendant. 
The trial court inferred from the presence of a blue 
plastic cup on the landing that Chris stopped to fix a drink in 
the kitchen. The court agreed with the prosecution that Chris 
went into the kitchen and poured something to drink before 
following defendant upstairs. This conclusion is not supported 
by any evidence in the trial record; it is merely the 
prosecution's supposition. A court may not "'make speculative 
leap[s] across . . . remaining gap[s]• in the evidence. . . . 
Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt" or^fehe^ve^4ict must fail. State v. Harman, 
767 P.2d 567, 5^ 6 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443/ 445 (Ut^h 1983))~r^The State must also prove the 
absence of self-defense after it is properly raised. It is not 
the defendant's burden to "establish a defense of self-defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the 
evidence." Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214. 
All the evidence other than the blue cup indicates that 
defendant reasonably believed herself to be in imminent danger 
of serious injury or death and that she had, indeed, already 
suffered serious injury. The trial court did not doubt her 
credibility, but nevertheless engaged in pure speculation about 
a cessation of hostilities. While the trial court's 
conclusions should be respected, the conviction may not oppose 
the weight of the evidence. Goodman, 763 P.2d at 787. We find 
the court's guilty verdict contrary to the clear weight of the 
evidence and, as a result, that the State failed to prove the 
elements ol manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Reversed, 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
1£ 
S'^*^&&*&S?1>'. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
BENCH, Judge (concurring and dissenting): 
I fully concur in the main opinion's conclusion that the 
State presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie 
case of manslaughter. I dissent from the conclusion that the 
guilty verdict is contrary to the cflear weight of the evidence. 
The main opinion correctly sets forth our standard of 
review. In order to upset the trial court's verdict, we must 
hold that the court's findings are "clearly erroneous." See 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Although 
perhaps less deferential than the standard applied in jury 
trials, we should regard the findings as accurate unless the 
evidence clearly shows they are in error. See Generally Sweeney 
Land Company v. Kimball, 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (1990). 
Determinations regarding credibility especially are left to the 
trial court. Xfi.; see also State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (1978) provides that: 
A person is justified in threatening or 
using force against another when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes 
that such force is necessary to defend 
himself . . . against such other's 
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a 
person is justified in using force which 
is intended or likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury only if he 
reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury to himself . . . . 
Defendant was therefore justified in using deadly force only if 
(1) she was subject to imminent attack, and (2) she reasonably 
believed that deadly force was necessary to prevent death or 
serious bodily injury to herself. 
The trial court concluded that defendant did not act in 
self-defense because there was a "reasonable, substantial 
cessation" in the hostilities when Mr. Strieby went into the 
kitchen to pour himself a drink. In reversing this case, my 
colleagues state that this finding "is not supported by any 
evidence in the trial record; it is merely the prosecution's 
supposition." Yet defendant herself testified that, during the 
fight on the stairs, "I kicked him in the groin. I pushed him, 
and he went into the kitchen." Whether he fixed a drink or 
not# I believe the evidence supports the trial court's finding 
regarding cessation of hostilities. At that point/ given her 
relative level of intoxication (another factual finding)/ 
defendant could have done any number of things to protect 
herself. Instead, she went upstairs, picked up a loaded 
revolver, and waited for Mr. Strieby.1 
Under these circumstances/ there was a basis for the trial 
court to find that defendant could not have reasonably believed 
that shooting Mr. Strieby was necessary to prevent her own 
imminent death or serious bodily injury. I do not believe the 
court's finding is clearly erroneous. I would therefore affirm 
tha conviction, 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. One of the witnesses of the earlier fight in the trailer 
testified that as defendant was leaving, HShe said as soon as 
she got her hands on a gun, he was a dead SOB." In evaluating 
all of the evidence, the trial court stated as follows: 
There was no physical evidence that 
Mrs. Strieby had, other than initially, 
tried any vigorous efforts to escape the 
condo, to shout, to holler, to seek the 
assistance of others. There was no 
evidence in the record to suggest that she 
had used objects of furniture or anything 
else in the house to fend him off or to 
take any evasive action. But rather that 
she went up the stairs and got the gun at 
a time when he wasn't in vigorous, hot 
pursuit. 
ADDENDUM B 
1 feet. And I put my hands up here because I had seen 
2 stars when I hit the -- when I fell down. It hurt. 
3 And I put my hands up and tried to double my body up 
4 so I would -- I was scared because of my back# and I 
5 was scared because of my head. I didn't know if I had 
6 hurt my head bad. 
7 He just wouldn't leave me alone. I got 
8 to the bottom of the stairs. I pushed myself back up 
9 on the stairs, and kicked at Chris. Pushed him up 
10 against the wall. He lost his balance. He doubled 
11 his fist up like he was going to hit me in the face. 
12 And I moved, and he went clear to the stairs with his 
13 fist. Then I pushed him again, and he went like to 
14 the kitchen. There's a door there thatfs -- it is an 
15 archway door to our kitchen. And he went through 
16 that. And I ran as fast as I could upstairs. 
17 Q. During this time, Kay, what was Chris 
18 saying to you? 
19 A. Told me he was going to kill me. I had 
20 never seen him like this. I had never seen his eyes 
21 -- I had never seen his face contorted to the point 
22 where he was completely uncontrollable, where he -- I 
23 couldn't talk to him. He just kept saying, "I am 
24 going to kill you, you bitch. I am going to kill you, 
25 you bitch. You don't deserve to live." 
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And he just -- he wouldn't stop; pushing 
and pulling* He had me by my shoulders, and shaking 
me. I pushed him away# and he'd lose his balance. He 
slid down the wall once. And when he got up, he 
grabbed at me. And I kicked him in the groin. I 
pushed him, and he went into the kitchen. But all 
this time he was telling me he was going to kill me. 
And told me -- just screaming things at me. Just 
screaming. 
Q. You mentioned you had never seen his 
eyes like that before. Can you describe what you 
mean? 
A. I -- I was really scared. I've never 
been afraid of Chris before, even though we fought, 
and I mean really fought. His eyes were — I can't 
explain it. At one time or two, he rolled them into 
the back of his head, and just -- he was just 
furious. He was screaming obscenities, and things 
things that -- sometimes he didn't even make sense. I 
was scared by then. So scared of him I knew that he 
was going to kill me. And he said he was going to 
kill me. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Had you ever seen him this way before? 
Never • 
You had always been able to control him 
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1 my legs• 
2 Q. And were you able to get away? 
3 A. After I got down the stairs, I connected 
4 him to the wall. I pushed with my foot and he lost 
5 his balance. That's when I got up to standing 
6 position, again. 
7 Q. And what happened next? 
8 A. He grabbed me, pushed me up against --
9 we have a closet there with, you know, a hall closet. 
10 Pushed me up against that, and I pushed him, and he 
11 went off into the kitchen. And I just ran. 
12 Q. Where did you run? 
13 A. I ran upstairs. 
14 Q. And when you got upstairs, where was he? 
15 A. He was yelling at me. I don't know if 
16 he was still in the kitchen, or on his way up the 
17 stairs. 
18 Q. What was he yelling? 
19 A. I told him not to hit me anymore. I 
20 said, "Chris, leave me alone." And he said, "I'm 
21 going to kill you, you bitch. You've just embarrassed 
22 me enough, and I am going to kill you." And I said 
23 "Chris, don't come up these stairs." I said, "Don't 
24 d o i t , Chris." 
25 Q. And what happened? What did you do 
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A. That's down there, that is --
Q. Maybe could you show us then where you 
were when you pushed him away from you? 
A* When he came in the door. 
Q. Well, why don't you come over here, if 
you would? 
Could you draw the downstairs portion of 
your house? 
A. We have a front door here (Marking), and 
the stairs were right there. 
Q. Maybe you ought to show us. 
A. The hallway came here, and a kitchen 
door that went into the kitchen here. And a bathroom 
here. Off of this is another door that went out to 
our garage area here. Counter space. Sink. 
Q. Now, is there a room here where you come 
into it first? 
A. No. Just an entryway in the stairway 
here. There is just an entryway, and then about --
past the kitchen door, then you come into the open 
living room area. 
Q. You testified that you pushed him off of 
you, and he went staggering towards the kitchen. Can 
you show us where that is? 
A. It is here. 
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Q. Can you put an X where he was when you 
pushed him off? 
A. About here in the middle where the door 
was, and I pushed him (Indicating). 
Q. And where did he go? 
A. He went up against this wall, and lost 
his balance. 
Q. Now, you said that he went towards the 
kitchen, did you not? 
A. I think that is the second or third time 
that we were scuffling. 
Q. The third time where did he go when you 
pushed him? I think you said towards the kitchen. 
Could you show us where that is? 
A. Well, the kitchen is here. 
Q. Where did he go then? 
A. He -- I don't know. He went -- I had 
turned around and ran. 
Q. So you pushed him toward the kitchen 
area (Indicating)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then you turn around and ran up these 
steps? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Where is the doorway, the main doorway? 
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